In this paper, we consider a game between an Internet Service (access) Provider (ISP) and content provider (CP) on a platform of end-user demand. A priceconvex demand-response is motivated based on the delaysensitive applications that are expected to be subjected to the assumed usage-priced priority service over besteffort service. Thus, we are considering a two-sided market with multiclass demand wherein one class (that under consideration herein) is delay-sensitive. Both the Internet and proposed Information Centric Network (ICN, encompassing Content Centric Networking (CCN)) scenarios are considered. For our purposes, the ICN case is basically different in the polarity of the side-payment (from ISP to CP in an ICN) and, more importantly here, in that content caching by the ISP is incentivized. A price-convex demandresponse model is extended to account for content caching. The corresponding Nash equilibria are derived and studied numerically.
I. INTRODUCTION
Network neutrality continues to be debated as its core economic issues as described in, e.g., [9] , have not been resolved. The debate concerns all participants in the enormous and growing Internet economy: Internet service (access) providers (ISPs), content providers (CPs, more generally providers of application services), endusers/consumers, and government regulators. Since the onset of this debate, researchers have studied parsimonious models of the Internet marketplace to gain insight into the macroeconomic forces in play. Performance is often assessed based on the Bertrand-Nash equilibria of noncooperative, decentralized games, and in terms of dynamical convergence to these equilibria, often considering limited resources (particularly bandwidth [23] ) as in classical Cournot games. This research was supported by NSF CNS grant 1116626.
For example, games involving end-users and content providers on an ISP platform were studied in [10] , [16] . Shapley values, indicating fair division of revenue with a coalition (or cooperative game), are used to argue for side-payments between ISPs and CPs in [14] , [15] . In this paper, we consider a noncooperative game between a single (or cooperating collective) CP and a single ISP on a platform of end-users served by both, i.e., a two-sided market. We assume that the applications under consideration are delay-sensitive. Applications only ever requiring best-effort service, and the revenue they generate for the ISP and CP players, are not considered herein.
In addition to the current Internet setting, we are also interested in that of proposed Information-Centric Networks (ICNs, generalizing Content-Centric Networks (CCNs)), e.g., [21] . In a related discussion, different scenarios for transit networks and content distribution networks (CDNs) were considered in [1] , including those in which the CDN (or individual CP) is incented to compensate the transit network (ISP) to cache its content. In this paper, the principle difference between the Internet and ICN settings is the direction of the sidepayment between ISP and CP, similar to the difference between content-centric and access-centric networking as described in [21] (see their Figures 5 and 6) . Also, the ISP is incentivized to cache in the ICN setting. This paper is organized as follows. Section II provides a background and, for this paper, motivational discussion on network neutrality, ISP-level content caching, and future Internet architectures. In Section III, we summarize prior results on a simple ISP-CP game for the "Internet" setting. In Section IV, we adapt these results to the ICN setting and extend the model to account for content caching by the ISP. A key element of the extension is a price-convex demand-response motivated by delay-sensitivity of the applications/content under consideration. In Section V, we give the results of a numerical study. Finally, we conclude in Section VI with a short summary.
II. BACKGROUND DISCUSSION

A. Network neutrality and ISP-level content caching
Network neutrality [9] has been supported by the Federal Communication Commission in the United States (with the possible exception of the cellular wireless access context [4] ). Basically, network neutrality stipulates that • two hypothetical sessions that are identical in terms of transmission patterns (bitrates), should be treated the same irrespective of the applications in play for the sessions (i.e., application neutrality), and • each end-host of a bidirectional session should pay only once to their own ISP for Internet access (i.e., no side payments to remote ISPs).
Departures from application neutrality are permitted at the request of the end-users, e.g., if the end-user requests a higher quality-of-service (QoS) for a specific session. Also, neutrality permits ISPs to act on aggregate traffic volume or to limit aggregate traffic bandwidth. As an example of the former, the ISP could enforce a quota stipulated in an end-user access agreement; such quotas are more tolerable by cellular wireless customers owing to the convenience of mobile access.
Moreover, there may be penalties for asymmetric (net) traffic-aggregates at inter-ISP and/or ISP/transit-provider peering points [22] . In some important instances, these penalties amount to a side-payments between CPs and remote ISP. For example, a large CP may team with a transit-provider (TP) and the peerings between that TP and an ISP may result in traffic volumes that are naturally much higher from TP to ISP than vice versa. This traffic asymmetry will generate revenue for the ISP from the TP, costs that the TP will naturally try to recover from the CP 1 So for the "Internet" setting, we assume a net side-payment from CP to ISP in the following.
Note that the presence of such transit costs may logically disincentivize ISP-level content caching, e.g., [12] . However, poor transfer-delay performance due to a lack of content caching by the ISP may diminish end-user demand (including causing end-users to change to a 1 Recently, ISPs have also targeted advertising revenue of CPs [10] by filtering-out advertising from delivered content [19] , presumably under the premise that such advertising was not explicitly requested (authorized) by the end-user. competing ISP) 2 For the "Internet" setting, we assume that ISPs are not incentivized to cache content in the following, but we do model the effect of delay performance on demand.
In the following, we generally assume consumers are, to some extent (for some delay-sensitive applications), willing to pay usage-based fees. Providers are then competing to settle on their usage-based prices, their goal being to maximize associated revenues. Note that a null price in the following does not mean a provider has no income, but rather that all their monthly revenues come from flat-rate priced service components. The study of the flat-rate regime is, however, out of the scope of this paper; see [17] , [20] for recent surveys of such issues.
B. Future Internet Architectures
In the following for a future "Information" Centric Network (ICN), we will assume a coalition of ISP and content resolver/rendezvous-point, the latter selecting a CP or CDN for each end-user query. If these entities are in fact separate, fairly dividing revenue between them can be argued through the use of Shapley values, e.g., [14] , [15] . Since in this setting the ISP is pulling content, rather than the CP pushing content as in the (current) "Internet" setting described in the previous subsection, one can, by the same argument, expect that the CP should be compensated for their networking costs. So, for the ICN setting, we assume a reverse in side-payments polarity, from ISP to CP 3 .
III. PROBLEM SET-UP: THE INTERNET MODEL
Suppose there are two providers, one content (CP indexed 2) and the other access (ISP indexed 1), with common consumer demand-response [8] 4 . First suppose that the demand response to price is linear: where d is demand sensitivity to the price, p 1 and p 2 are, respectively, the prices charged by the ISP and CP, and D max > 0 is the demand at zero usage based price 5 . Suppose the revenue of the ISP is
where p s is the side payment from content to access provider. Similarly, the revenue of the CP is
Consider a noncooperative game played by the CP and ISP adjusting their prices, respectively p 2 and p 1 , to maximize their respective revenues, with all other parameters fixed. In particular, the fixed side-payment p s is here assumed regulated. Note that the utilities are linear functions of p s so that if p s were under the control of one of the players, it simply would be set at an extremal value.
The following simple result was shown in [2] , [6] .
Theorem 1. The interior Nash equilibrium 6 is
Note that ISPs are continuing to depart from pure flat-rate pricing (based on maximum access bandwidth) for unlimited monthly volume, e.g., [5] . 6 In this paper, we do not consider boundary Nash equilibria, where at least one player is selecting an extremal value for one of their control parameters, often resulting in that player essentially opting out of the game, or maximally profiting from it at the expense of the other player. The boundary equilibria are also specified in [2] .
with player utilities U * 1 , U * 2 = D 2 max /(9d). Note that this result allows p s < 0, i.e., net side payment is from ISP to CP (remuneration for content instead of access bandwidth). But in the Internet setting, we take p s > 0, whether there is direct side-payment from CP to ISP (or, again, indirectly by payment through the peering contract between the residential ISP and the ISP of the CP -a contract that penalizes for asymmetric traffic exchange neutrally based on aggregate traffic volume).
In [6] , [11] , we showed that the ISP may actually experience a reduction in revenue/utility with the introduction of side payments, using a communal demand model that had different demand-sensitivity-to-price parameters d per provider type and also multiple providers of each type (i.e., provider competition). Such a model was also considered in [3] .
In [11] , we used a convex, rather than linear, demand response to price, e.g.,
where a ≥ 1 and
This model was motivated in [11] by considering two different types of users, as follows. Suppose that (userdesignated) premium class-of-service (CoS) applications are • delay sensitive, • given service priority by the ISP over best-effort applications for the bandwidth B available between CP and ISP, • subjected to usage-based charges by the ISP at price p 1 . Best-effort applications exploit reserved-but-unused bandwidth (≤ B) by the premium CoS applications, and unreserved bandwidth if any. So, some delay-sensitive applications may be content with under best-effort CoS when demand for premium CoS is low (hence reservedbut-unused bandwidth is high). Thus, as demand increases for premium CoS applications, say because price p = p 1 + p 2 reduces, there may be additional demand owing to migration of delay-sensitive applications by more price-sensitive users who would otherwise tend to assign their delay-sensitive applications to best-effort CoS.
To better motivate this demand model, in Appendix A of [13] we derive a (more complex) price-convex demand response based on the delay-sensitivity of the usage-priced applications under consideration.
The following simple extension of Theorem 1 was shown in [11] by summing the first-order conditions ∂U i /∂p i = 0, i ∈ {1, 2}, cf., (7) . Theorem 2. The interior Nash equilibrium for a strictly convex demand response D is
where p * = p * 1 + p * 2 solves 2D(p * ) + p * D (p * ) = 0.
and |p s | < p * /2.
For the example of (5) with a > 1,
Again, under communal demand response with only one provider of each type, neither p * = p * 1 + p * 2 nor U * 1 depend on the side payment p s .
IV. ICN MODEL
Again, in an ICN, residential users request content (or, more generally, information regarding application services) of the ISP/resolver, and the ISP/resolver decides the content provider. Therefore in an ICN, it's reasonable to assume that the side-payment is from ISP to CP, i.e., p s < 0. Also, the ISP is motivated to cache content, unlike for our simple Internet case, to reduce the side payment (i.e., avoid paying for, e.g., the networking costs of the ISP-selected CP to transmit the user-requested content). Suppose that the ISP decides to cache a fraction κ of the content and this results in lower delay between the CP and ISP, and a lower required side-payment to the CP, cf., (11) . If we model mean delay as 1/(B − D) , where B is the service capacity between CP and ISP, then with caching factor κ, this delay is reduced to 1/ (B − (1 − κ)D) . For the model of Appendix B of [13] , the demand response:
• is increasing in caching factor κ, • tends to convex in price as κ → 0, and • tends to linear in price as κ → 1. In the following for the ICN setting, we take the following simplified form of demand response than that of Appendix B of [13] with these above properties:
Note how in this model, neither D max nor p max are affected by κ, but cf. the linear demand model (14) . Because of ISP caching, the ISP and CP utilities generalize to
again with p s < 0, where c(κ) is the cost of caching borne by the ISP. We can use the results of Theorem 2 here, with parameters (1 − κ)p s and κ + (1 − κ)a instead of p s and a respectively, because the caching cost c component of U 1 does not depend on p 2 or p 1 , and |p s | < p * /2 implies |(1 − a)p s | < p * /2. We can conclude that the optimal utilities for ICN are
In the following section on numerical results, we consider performance at Nash equilibria as a function of κ (under the assumption that |p s | < p max /2).
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we give some numerical results for the models of communal CP/ISP demand given in the previous sections. Despite the fact that our models do not involve a lot of parameters, our aim is not a comprehensive numerical study over the entire parameter space. Instead, we give some numerical results for parametric instances to show how optimal caching factors can be identified and comparisons made between the "Internet" and ICN scenarios described above. To this end, Figures 2-5 depict ISP utility U * 1 /(D max p max ) with demandexponent parameter a = 2.0 and assume a caching cost that is polynomial in caching factor, i.e., of the form
In Figure 2 , b = 0 (i.e., no cache cost, c = 0) and we see that U * 1 increases with caching factor κ. By (12) , this figure also represents CP revenue U * 2 for the cases of Figures 2-5 . Figures 3 and 4 illustrate how linear cache cost (n = 1) leads to optimal κ ∈ {0, 1}: if b ≤ 0.04 then optimal κ = 1, otherwise if b ≥ 0.05 then optimal κ = 0 (the "Internet" case).
In Appendix C of [13] , we argue how c(κ) is convex. Figure 5 shows how the ISP utility may be concave in κ for quadratic (convex) cache cost (n = 2) -here for b = 0.05, optimal κ ≈ 0.4. Alternatively, we could consider a convex, exponential caching cost function
where b 1 , b 2 > 0. Figure 6 shows how the ISP utility may also be be concave -here for b 1 = 0.05 and b 2 = 0.2, optimal caching factor κ ≈ 0.5. Again, note that under the premise that ISP-level caching is not incentivized in for the (current) Internet setting, we can directly compare against the ISP utilities for the "Internet" case by simply using the ISP utilities at κ = 0 in these figures.
Finally, consider the simpler case of demand-response that is linear in price. We can take the caching factor κ as simply reducing the demand sensitivity to price (equivalently, increasing the maximum price for which there is non-zero demand): where σ > 0. Here, the results of Theorem 2 directly apply with p max simply replaced by p max (1 + σκ) and a = 1 (or Theorem 1 with the demand-sensitivity d replaced by d/ (1 + σκ) ). For quadratic caching cost, the ISP utility,
is maximized when the caching factor is κ * = min{σ/(18b), 1}. So, when κ * < 1, the concave, quadratic ISP utility U * 1 has maximal value D max p max 1 9 + σ 2 18 2 b .
VI. SUMMARY AND FUTURE WORK
We studied a two-player game involving a content provider and network-access provider on a platform of price-convex end-user demand. In our Information Centric Networking (ICN) model, side-payments may flow from the Internet Service Provider (ISP) to the Content Provider (CP) -the assumed opposite direction of that of the (current) "Internet" model. Also, depending on the cost of ISP caching, the ISP may be incentivized to cache in the ICN setting, but we assumed that there was no incentive for the ISP to cache in the Internet version of the considered game. For caching cost that is concave in caching factor, and price-quadratic demandresponse, we showed how a fractional caching factor could be optimal at Nash equilibrium.
In the future, we will extend this work to consider competition among like providers, where caching in the Internet case may be incentivized (better delay performance to retain consumers), side payments play a more significant role, and there may be coalitions among different providers, i.e., eyeball ISPs. Also, we will consider different demand-sensitivities to prices charged by different providers.
